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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2092 
___________ 
 
RAMON EDILIO GOMEZ, 
               Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
               Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A041-426-808) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter Durling  
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 6, 2014 
 
Before: JORDAN, GREENBERG and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  February 10, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Ramon Edilio Gomez, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, petitions 
for review of a final order of removal entered by the Board of Immigration Appeals (the 
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“Board”) on March 22, 2013.  For the following reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review.   
 Gomez was admitted to the United States on June 30, 1988, as a lawful permanent 
resident.  In 2011, a grand jury in North Carolina returned an indictment against him 
containing one count of conspiracy to ship, transport, receive and possess contraband 
cigarettes and transport stolen property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2342(a), 2314, and 
371 (Count 1); two counts of shipping, transporting, receiving, and possessing contraband 
cigarettes and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2342(a) and 2 (Counts 2 
and 3); and one count of transporting in interstate commerce stolen property and aiding 
and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2 (Count 4). (A.R. 109-18.)  The 
government alleged that Gomez conspired to import stolen and untaxed cigarettes from 
North Carolina and resell them in New Jersey, without paying New Jersey’s cigarette 
excise tax.  Gomez pleaded not guilty to Counts 1 and 4 and guilty to Counts 2 and 3.  
Following a bench trial, the District Court found Gomez guilty of Counts 1 and 4, and 
subsequently sentenced him to thirty months’ imprisonment on each count, to be served 
concurrently.  (A.R. 86.) 
 The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings 
against Gomez by filing a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) in 2012.  The NTA charged him as 
removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of an 
aggravated felony, specifically, a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) for 
which the term of imprisonment was at least one year.  (A.R. 182.)  See 8 U.S.C. 
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§§ 1101(a)(43)(G) and (U).  Gomez denied DHS’s allegations and denied the charge of 
removability.   
 The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) issued a “Ruling on Aggravated Felony,” finding 
that Gomez’s federal conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2 constituted a theft 
offense and aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(G) and (U).  (A.R. 
121-22.)  Gomez was ordered removed on November 13, 2012.  (A.R. 38-39.)  The 
Board affirmed the IJ’s decision without an opinion.  (A.R. 3.)  Gomez timely filed a 
petition for review. 
 Generally, we lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal against an alien, 
like Gomez, who is removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony.  8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  We retain jurisdiction, however, to review any constitutional or 
legal questions raised in his petition for review.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Cruz v. 
Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 246-47 (3d Cir. 2006).  Whether Gomez was convicted of an 
offense that constitutes an aggravated felony is a legal question we review de novo.  
Restrepo v. Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 790 (3d Cir. 2010).  When the Board affirms the 
IJ’s decision without an opinion, we review the IJ’s opinion.  Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 
228, 245 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).   
 The issue presented here is whether the IJ properly determined that Gomez’s 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2 constituted an aggravated felony.  Gomez 
argues that the statute under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 2314, is a divisible 
statute, and that the government failed to meet its burden of proving that the part of the 
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statute pertaining to transporting stolen goods formed the basis of his conviction.  He 
claims that the contraband cigarettes were not stolen because he purchased them from a 
confidential informant who, in turn, purchased them from the government.  The 
government points out that Gomez was found guilty of Counts 1 and 4 of the indictment, 
both pertaining to transporting stolen property.  Gomez’s conviction is no longer open to 
direct or collateral attack, and he cannot challenge his removal order by arguing the 
illegality of his conviction.  See Drakes v. I.N.S., 330 F.3d 600, 604 (3d Cir. 2003).   
 The District Court found Gomez guilty of transporting stolen property under 
Counts 1 and 4 of the indictment.  The Board has made clear that anyone who receives 
stolen property and resolves to keep or sell it has committed the offense of receiving 
stolen property.  In re Bahta, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1381, 1391 (BIA 2000).  We perceive no 
error in the IJ’s conclusion that Gomez’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2 
constituted a theft offense and an aggravated felony as defined in the INA.1
 
  8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101(a)(43)(G) and (U).  (A.R. 121-22.)  Therefore, Gomez’s petition for review will 
be denied. 
                                              
1 The IJ properly adhered to the modified categorical approach here because Gomez’s 
statute of conviction “lists elements in the alternative.”  Rojas v. Att’y Gen., 728 F.3d 
203, 215 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 
(2013)).  The IJ first defined receipt of stolen property consistent with Bahta and then, 
based on the indictment and judgment, determined that the convictions on Counts 1and 4 
constituted theft offenses and aggravated felonies.  Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284-85.   
 
 
